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Abstract
We build a model of the nancial sector to explain why adverse asset shocks in good economic
times lead to a sudden drying up of liquidity. Financial rms raise short-term debt in order to
nance asset purchases. When asset fundamentals worsen, debt induces rms to risk-shift; this
limits their funding liquidity and their ability to roll over debt. Firms may de-lever by selling
assets to better-capitalized rms. Thus the market liquidity of assets depends on the severity
of the asset shock and the system-wide distribution of leverage. This distribution of leverage is,
however, itself endogenous to future prospects. In particular, short-term debt is relatively cheap
to issue in good times when expectations of asset fundamentals are benign, resulting in entry to
the nancial sector of rms with less capital or high leverage. Due to such entry, even though
the incidence of nancial crises is lower in good times, their severity in terms of de-leveraging
and evaporation of market liquidity can in fact be greater.
Keywords: risk-shifting, credit rationing, market liquidity, funding liquidity, re sales, nancial
crises, cash-in-the-market pricing.
JEL Classication: G12, G20, D45, D52, D53
Introduction
\Where did all the liquidity go? Six months ago, everybody was talking about boundless global
liquidity supporting risky assets, driving risk premiums to virtually nothing, and now everybody is
talking about a global liquidity crunch, driving risk premiums half the distance to the moon. Tell
me, Mac, where did all the liquidity go?" - Paul McCulley, PIMCO Investment Outlook, Summer
2007
We argue that the build-up of leverage in the nancial sector in good economic times is a key
explanation for why adverse asset shocks in such times are associated with severe drying up of
liquidity and deep discounts in asset prices. We provide the mechanics of this argument in a model
of nancial institutions that endogenizes the short-term rollover nature of their debt and examines
1de-leveraging and asset sales as an industry equilibrium phenomenon. In particular, the model
illustrates that while the incidence of nancial crises is lower when expectations of fundamentals
are good, their severity can in fact be greater in such times due to greater system-wide leverage.
The model also provides a micro-economic foundation for the linkage between market liquidity,
the ease of selling assets at fair prices, and funding liquidity, the ease of rolling over existing debt.
Since the backdrop we have in mind is one of trading-based nancial institutions which are
typically highly levered, we focus on the agency problem of asset substitution or risk-shifting by
borrowers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) wherein a borrower, after raising debt, has incentives to
transfer wealth away from lenders by switching to riskier assets unless the expected prots from
safer assets are suciently high. Related to the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Diamond
(1989, 1991), this risk-shifting problem rations potential borrowers in that it limits the maximum
amount of nancing they can raise from lenders. Asset sales provide a mechanism through which
borrowers can de-lever and relax the extent of their rationing.
We cast this building block of an individual rm's levering and de-levering in an industry
equilibrium. There is a continuum of nancial rms which have undertaken some ex-ante debt
nancing (exogenous initially, endogenized later). At their maturity, these liabilities need to
be rolled over. To this end, rms attempt to raise additional debt nancing, but its extent is
limited due to the risk-shifting problem. The worse the asset-quality shock at the time of rollover
(for instance, adverse information about asset's prospects), the lower is the asset's expected
protability to intermediaries, and thus the incentive to risk-shift to higher risk assets is more
severe. In anticipation, the greater is the credit rationing of borrowers. Firms that are rationed
attempt to de-lever by liquidating some or all of their assets. Assets, however, are specic and
can only be acquired by the set of remaining nancial rms that has spare debt capacity (as in
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).1 The remaining rms can also raise nancing against the assets that
they buy. However, they have the opportunity to risk-shift too, which limits their nancing for
asset purchase. Thus, the liquidation price, which is determined by the market-clearing condition,
is of the \cash-in-the-market" type (Allen and Gale, 1994): When a large number of rms are
liquidating assets, market price is below the expected discounted cash ow and is determined by
the distribution of spare debt capacity in the economy.
Crucially, the de-leveraging equilibrium is characterized by the funding liquidity per unit of
asset, which is a mirror image of the adversity of the asset shock and the severity of risk-shifting
problem: (1) Funding liquidity divides the set of rms into three categories { those that are fully
liquidated, those that are partially liquidated, and those that provide liquidity (\arbitrageurs")
and purchase assets at re-sale prices; (2) By determining the opportunity cost of liquidating an
asset, funding liquidity also determines the equilibrium extent of de-leveraging of rationed rms;
1Alternately, one could assume that lenders are short-term debt providers such as money market funds which
are constrained by regulation from owning long-term assets.
2and (3) Through these rst two eects, funding liquidity determines the equilibrium price at which
assets are liquidated.
Formally, the equilibrium price of the asset is its funding liquidity plus a measure of the spare
debt capacity of the economy, both of which depend on the asset shock and the latter also depends
on the distribution of initial leverage in the economy. An interesting result that stems from this
characterization of price is that as asset shocks worsen, the moral-hazard intensity increases (i.e.,
the spread between the return on the good asset and the risk-shifting asset declines), rms'
ability to raise nancing against assets is lowered and equilibrium levels of spare debt capacity
in the economy fall. In turn, the market for assets clears at lower prices. This is simply the
result that funding liquidity aects market liquidity (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002 and Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2009), as both are manifestations of agency problems constraining nancial rms'
ability to roll over existing debt.
In the preceding discussion, the ex-ante structure of liabilities undertaken by rms was treated
as given. We endogenize this structure by assuming that ex ante, rms are ranked by the amount
of initial capital they have, or conversely, by the initial external nancing they need to fund the
project.2 The incremental nancing is raised through short-term debt contracts that give lenders
the ability to liquidate ex post in case promised payments are not met. We show that this short-
term, rollover form of nancing of assets that grants control to lenders in case of default (as in
collateral and margin requirements, repo nancing, borrowing from money-market funds, etc) is
optimal from the standpoint of raising maximum ex-ante nance. Intuitively, if lenders do not
have the right to liquidate assets, then borrowers can threaten ex post to alter the risk of assets
and write down lender claims. In anticipation, lenders will lower the ex-ante liquidity they are
prepared to give borrowers. Hence, the ecient contract gives lenders the bargaining power in
the form of control rights to liquidate the rm as this maximizes the ex-ante debt capacity.
This augmentation of our benchmark model leads to an interesting and important equilibrium
recursion: on the one hand, the promised payment for a given amount of debt nancing is
decreasing in the level of liquidation prices in case of default; on the other hand, the liquidation
price is itself determined by the distribution of promised debt payments since these aect the
ex-post rationing and de-leveraging faced by rms. We show that there is a unique solution to
this xed-point recursion, characterized by the fraction of rms that cannot meet their initial
nancing needs (and are excluded) and by the relation from future asset shocks to corresponding
prices. In particular, the downside risk of asset shocks aects the cost of raising leverage and a
certain fraction of poorly capitalized rms are unable to enter the nancial sector. Therefore, the
extent of entry is endogenous to anticipated downside risk.
2For example, hedge-fund managers, structured purpose vehicles, broker-dealers or investment banks, and
commercial banks, must raise dierent amounts of leveraged nancing in order to trade. This kind of ranking
of rms by their leverage can be considered as a reduced-form metaphor for richer heterogeneity or regulatory
restrictions determining their extent of equity capitalization relative to debt.
3While this endogenous entry renders analytical comparative statics dicult, numerical exam-
ples using a recursive, constructive algorithm provides an important insight. As the distribution
of future asset shocks improves in a rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) sense, the distri-
bution of funding liquidity improves too, rms face a lower need to de-lever and to engage in re
sales in the future, and, thus, lenders require lower promised payments ex ante. In other words,
leverage is \cheap" in good economic times due to lower expected losses from default and even
institutions with low levels of initial capitalization can enter the nancial sector. Interestingly,
there is a robust set of economies for which a better ex-ante distribution of fundamentals is in
fact associated with lower prices when adverse shocks to asset quality materialize, compared to
prices in the same ex-post states when the economy is facing a worse ex-ante distribution of
fundamentals.
This counterintuitive result arises due to endogenous entry in our model. As explained above,
good times enable even highly levered institutions to be funded ex ante. Even though bad times
are less likely to follow, in case they do materialize, a greater mass of highly levered rms ends
up with funding liquidity problems and is forced to de-lever through asset sales. If there is
a suciently large entry of low-capitalized rms in good times because, for instance, there is
abundant ow of liquidity into the nancial sector due to global imbalances (Bernanke, 2005),
then the eect of de-leveraging can be substantial, generating deep discounts in market prices.
This result explains well the apparent \puzzle" in nancial markets that when there is a sudden,
adverse asset-quality shock to the economy from a period of high expectations of fundamentals,
the drop in asset prices seems rather severe. This phenomenon was highlighted in the introductory
quote by Paul McCulley in PIMCO's Investment Outlook of Summer 2007 following the onset of
sub-prime crisis when the nancial system appeared to switch from expectations of low volatility
and abundant global liquidity to one with severe asset-price deterioration and severe drying up
of both market and funding liquidity. While there are many elements at work in explaining the
complex phenomena characterizing the crisis of 2007-09 (some of which we detail below), our
model claries that leverage structure of the economy as a whole, in particular, the extent of
highly leveraged institutions in the system, is endogenous to expectations leading up to a crisis.
The capital structure of nancial sector as a whole is crucial to understanding the severity of re
sales that hit asset markets when nancial intermediaries attempt to roll over their short-term
debt but lenders ration them.
Section 1 provides a backdrop for our theoretical analysis using empirical facts relating to
the crisis of 2007-09. Section 2 sets up the benchmark model of risk-shifting and asset sales.
Section 3 augments the benchmark model to study the ex-ante debt capacity of rms. Section 4
discusses the related literature. Section 5 concludes. Proofs and the constructive algorithm for
solving the xed-point recursion introduced in Section 3 are in the Appendix.
41 Motivation
Our theoretical analysis is built around (i) the prominence of short-term rollover debt in capital
structure of nancial rms, (ii) low cost of debt in good economic times which leads to entry
of highly leveraged nancial rms, and (iii) inability to rollover short-term debt and induced re
sales of assets, especially for highly-levered rms, when adverse shocks materialize. As we explain
below, all three of these played an important role in the nancial crisis of 2007-09 and the period
preceding it.
Starting August 9 2007, the sub-prime crisis took hold of the nancial sector. In fact, since
the beginning of 2007, information about the deteriorating quality of mortgage assets hit markets
on a repeated basis. The impending losses for banks, broker-dealers and hedge funds involved
in mortgage-backed assets cast a doubt over the solvency of institutional balance-sheets. An
important piece that contributed to the sharp reaction of markets was the highly short-term nature
of debt with which these assets, and more broadly balance-sheets, had been nanced. In particular,
debt was in the form of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), repurchase agreements (repos),
or unsecured commercial paper (CP) that had to be rolled over at short maturities, often overnight
but always less than a few months.
It became progressively clear in the following months that funding conditions had tightened
and rollovers of short-term debt would be dicult. To see how sharp was the reaction of nanc-
ing conditions, Figure 1 Panel A shows the cost of issuing ABCP over the federal funds rate,
illustrating that it rose from benign levels of 10 to 15 basis points to over 100 basis points in the
months following August 9, 2007. Similarly, Figure 1 Panel B shows the dramatic fall in ABCP
outstanding { a measure of nancial rms' ability to roll over this debt { whereby in two years
from August 2007 the levels reverted from the high of over $1.2 trillion to the 2004 level of about
just half as such.
Further, there was also substantial liquidation risk. In particular, if assets had to be liquidated,
prices would be a far cry from their \fair" or \normal-time" valuations since natural buyers of
such assets were themselves hit by the shock to asset quality. This was best epitomized in
the suspension of mark-to-market accounting by BNP Paribas' hedge funds on August 9, 2007
whose announcement triggered the ABCP freeze. Though departures of asset prices from their
fundamental values are hard to identify conclusively, Figure 2 Panel A shows that the index levels
of prices of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities were close to par until Summer of 2007, but
declined steadily in the next six months to 40 to 80 cents on a dollar, as funding conditions
for nancial institutions who held these assets worsened and the market for secondary sales of
these assets progressively thinned. Essentially, de-leveraging of the nancial sector was ongoing
because of the inability to roll over existing debt, emphasized by our model, and the consequent
re sales of assets.
5In the decade preceding the crisis, there had been a secular downward shift in macroeconomic
volatility, the so-called \Great Moderation" (Stock and Watson, 2002). As per this explana-
tion, improvements in risk-sharing within and across economies were believed to have stabilized
macroeconomic output. There was also a downward revision of asset price volatility as shown
in Figure 2 Panel B for levels of VIX, a measure of market volatility implied from option prices.
VIX had ranged typically above 20% prior to 2003, but remained almost always between 10%
and 20% up until Summer of 2007. In turn, credit risk of various assets was deemed to have also
experienced a fundamental downward revision, enabling issuance of cheaper debt and a build-up
of leverage in the nancial system.
Indeed, during 2003 to 2Q 2007, there was substantial entry of new nancial intermediaries
that were increasingly more levered, and we stress that this was not just a scaling-up of institutions
with a given distribution of leverage. In particular, there was an extraordinary growth in the
shadow banking sector: structured purpose vehicles which had close to zero capitalization (again,
see Figure 1 Panel B), and in balance-sheets of broker-dealers whose leverage rose from assets
to equity ratios of 10:1 to 30:1 (Adrian and Shin, 2008). These were funded respectively by
short-term ABCP and CP or repos, all forms of rollover debt.
And, when the asset shocks to underlying mortgage assets materialized in 2007, the sequence
of de-leveraging that ensued, described for example in Acharya, Philippon, Richardson and Roubini
(2009), is consistent with the model. Indeed, inability to rollover debt in the form of ABCP, CP
and repo \runs" materialized rst for worst-capitalized entities, starting with structured purpose
vehicles, spreading next to broker-dealers, then to hedge-funds, and nally, to the relatively
better-capitalized commercial banks.3
These phenomena { build-up of short-term debt in good economic times and entry of highly-
levered rms, asset-side shocks that lead to problems in rolling over debt, followed by substantial
de-leveraging, re sales and liquidity discounts in asset prices { are what our model aims to derive
as equilibrium outcomes when nancial intermediaries have incentives to risk-shift and borrowing
contracts endogenously respond to this agency problem.
3Also consistently with the model's partition of well-capitalized rms as acquirers of assets from highly-
leveraged ones, broker-dealers that failed or would have failed were taken over by commercial or universal banks




Our model is set up as follows. At date 0, there is a continuum of agents who have access to
identical, valuable trading technology (\asset") of limited size. Agents do not have all of the
nancing required to incur the xed costs for setting up rms that will invest in this asset and
dier in the amount of personal initial capital they can deploy for investment. They can raise
external nancing from a set of nanciers in order to meet the xed costs.
Assets are specic in that nanciers cannot redeploy them. We assume assets are rendered
worthless in hands of nanciers unless they sell them right away to those who can deploy them.
Conversely, rms are not in the business of providing external nance to each other. Some
examples of this setup would be traders setting up hedge funds and borrowing from prime brokers,
or broker-dealers nanced with short-term commercial paper from money-market funds, although
some of our assumptions make the caricature of these settings somewhat extreme.
Each asset produces an uncertain cash ow at date 2. Agents (non-nanciers) have the option
of switching from their asset to an alternate, riskier asset (e.g., through poor risk management
of a trade) that is less valuable but may be attractive once external nancing is raised. Such
possibility aects the nature and extent of external nancing.
At date 1, an observable but non-veriable public signal concerning the common quality of
the valuable assets becomes available. If the optimal contract at date 0 so species, nanciers
may demand repayments at date 1, or they may eectively roll over their nancing to date 2. An
asset sale market exists where assets can be liquidated to other rms at market-clearing prices
in exchange for cash that can be used to pay o existing debt. Firms acquiring assets may raise
nancing at date 1 against existing assets as well as assets to be acquired.
We formally specify and solve the model backwards starting with the second period between
date 1 and date 2. To this end, we rst assume and later prove that the optimal date-0 contract
takes the form of debt that is due at date 2, but it is hard in the sense that it gives nanciers
(lenders) the control at date 1 to demand early repayment if it is optimal for them to do so.
Taking this as an assumption to start with, we next solve the second-period model for a particular
realization of the public signal about asset quality.
2.2 Benchmark second-period model
The time-line for the model, starting at date 1, is specied in Figure 3. All rm owners and
creditors are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate of interest is zero. After raising (new or rolled-
7over) external nance at date 1, there is the possibility of moral hazard at the level of each rm.
In particular, we consider asset-substitution moral hazard. Firm's existing investment is in an
asset which is a positive net present value investment. However, after asset sales and raising of
external nance at date 1, each rm can switch its investment to another asset.
We denote the assets as j, j 2 f1;2g, yielding a date-2 cash ow per unit size of yj > 0
with probability j 2 (0;1), and no cash ow otherwise. We assume that 1 < 2, y1 > y2,
1y1  2y2, and 1y1  i. In words, the rst asset is riskier and has a higher payo than the
second asset, but the second asset has a greater expected value. Also, taking account of the
nancial liability at date 1, investing in the rst asset is a negative net present value investment
for all rms. We assume the shift between assets occurs at zero cost. The simplest interpretation
could be a deterioration in the risk-management function of the nancial intermediary or outright
fraud, that allows pursuit of riskier strategies with the same underlying asset or technology.
The external nance at date 1 is raised in the form of debt with face value of f to be repaid
at date 2. Then, the incentive compatibility condition to ensure that rm owners invest in asset
j = 2 (that is, do not risk-shift to asset j = 1) requires that
2(y2   f) > 1(y1   f): (1)






Since this condition bounds the face value of debt that can provide incentives to invest in the
better asset, we obtain credit rationing as formalized in the following lemma. This result is by
itself not new (see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Lemma 1 Firms with liability of  at date 1 that is greater than   2f cannot roll over debt
by only issuing new external nance; that is, they are credit-rationed.
To see this result, note rst that f < y2 so that borrowing up to face value f is indeed
feasible in equilibrium provided it enables the borrowing rm to meet its funding needs. In other
words, rms with     2f borrow, invest in the better asset, and simultaneously meet
their funding constraint. Second, note that for  > , investment is in the rst, riskier asset.
However, in this case funding constraint requires that the face value be ^ f =

1 which is greater
than y1 for all  > . That is, rms with liability  exceeding  cannot borrow and are rationed.
Also  is increasing in 2, the quality of the better asset relative to the riskier one. Eco-
nomically,  represents the funding liquidity per unit of the asset or the (inverse) moral hazard
8intensity. When the gap between the quality of two assets is large, risk-shifting incentives of asset
owners are weak and the asset can sustain greater debt nancing. Conversely, if the quality of
the better asset deteriorates relative to the riskier asset, then the debt capacity of the asset falls.
The funding liquidity , which we treat as a function of asset quality 2, plays a crucial role in
analysis to follow.
We assume in what follows that the continuum of rms is ranked by liabilities  such that
  g() over [min;max], where min  1y1 < 2y2  max and  2 [min;max]. Thus,
Lemma 1 implies that rms in the range (;max] are credit-rationed in our benchmark model
and must \de-lever", that is, engage in asset sales to pay o some or all of their existing debt.4
2.3 Asset sales
Suppose a rm can sell its assets at a market-clearing price of p, which we endogenize later. If
rm sells  units of assets, it generates p as proceeds from asset sale which can be used to repay
its debt. The remaining balance-sheet of the rm is of the size (1   ), and its per unit debt
capacity is  as in Lemma 1. Thus, its funding liquidity is given by [p + (1   )]. As long
as liquidation price p exceeds the per unit debt capacity of the risky asset , funding liquidity
expands with asset sales. We assume and show later that it is indeed the case that p  . To
raise  units in total to roll over debt, the rms must choose a liquidation policy   0 such that
  [p + (1   )
]: (3)
For rms with  < , this constraint is met without engaging any asset sales. For rationed
rms of Lemma 1, that is, for  > , we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 If the liquidation price p is greater than , then asset sales relax credit rationing





Thus, asset sales increase in a rm's liability  and decrease in liquidation price p.
4A relevant issue is if a rm make a collateralized loan instead of selling the asset. This issue is intimately
related to the issue of asset-specicity. The only way a lender can ensure there is no risk-shifting possibility with
a collateralized asset is to manage the assets himself. We eectively assume this would cause asset values to
depreciate to zero. Alternately, the lender can take the asset as collateral and delegate the asset management to
a third party in the nancial sector, but then we are back to the risk-shifting problem and the argument repeats.
9The liquidation price p plays a crucial role in determining the extent of asset sales or de-
leveraging. In particular, if liquidation price is low, then rms have to liquidate a large part of
their existing investment. Next, we introduce a market for liquidation of the asset at date 1 and
study how it inuences and is inuenced by the equilibrium level of asset sales. Also, we assumed
in the analysis above that p  max. We verify below that this will indeed be the case under our
maintained assumption 2y2  max.
2.4 Market for asset sales
Assets liquidated by rms that face rationing ( > ) are acquired by those that are not rationed
( < ) and have spare debt capacity. We consider standard market clearing for asset sales. An
important consideration is that asset purchasers, by virtue of their smaller liabilities, may be able
to raise liquidity not only against their existing assets but also against assets they will acquire.
Formally, suppose that a non-rationed rm with liability  acquires  units of assets. Then,
the total liquidity available to the rm for asset purchase is given by
l(;) = [(1 + )
   ]: (5)
That is, the funding ability of a non-rationed rm consists of its spare debt capacity from existing
assets, (   ), plus the liquidity that can be raised against assets to be acquired, .
The pertinent question is: How many units of assets would this rm be prepared to buy as
a function of the price p? Note that no rm would acquire assets at a price higher than their
expected payo. Denoting this price as p = 2y2, we obtain the following demand function
^ (p;) for the rm. For p > p, ^  = 0. For p < p, ^  is set to its highest feasible value given the





Finally, for p = p, buyers' demand is indierent between 0 and ^  (evaluated at p).











where we have stressed the dependence on funding liquidity .
Given this demand function for non-rationed rms, we can specify the market-clearing condi-












10The two terms correspond respectively to (i) partial asset liquidations by rms with  2 (;p]
to meet their liabilities, and (ii) complete liquidation of rms with  2 (p;max] which cannot




) = 0: (9)
If excess demand is positive for all p < p, then p = p (since buyers are indierent at this price
between buying and not buying, and their demand can be set equal to the supply).
Before characterizing the behavior of the equilibrium price, it is useful to consider properties
of the demand and supply functions. First, both demand and supply functions decline in price p.
This is because as price increases, asset purchasers can only buy fewer assets given their limited
liquidity. Simultaneously, rationed rms need to liquidate a smaller quantity of their assets.
Hence, what is important is the behavior of excess demand function, E(p;), as a function of
price p. We focus below on the case where p < p, the details of the case where p = p are in the
Appendix (in Proof of Proposition 2).














Integrating this equation by parts yields
E(p;








min g()d and G(min) = 0.






If the solution to this equation exceeds p, excess demand is positive for all p < p and thus p = p.
First, from this representation of market-clearing condition, we observe that the price can
never fall below the threshold level of  (as we assumed earlier while deriving Proposition 1).
This is because non-rationed rms can always raise  of liquidity against each additional unit of
asset they purchase. Hence, at p = , their demand for asset purchase is innitely high. The
second term captures the eect of spare liquidity in the system. Intuitively, if this spare liquidity
is high, then the price is at its frictionless value of p, else it reects a re-sale discount.
Second, the price can never be higher than p, as above this price demand is zero and there
can be no market clearing. Together, these two facts guarantee an interior market-clearing price
11p 2 [;p]. Third, as intuition would suggest, the excess demand function is strictly decreasing
in p at the market clearing price p, which yields a unique p. And, nally, the key determinant
of the market-clearing price is the funding liquidity per unit of the asset, . This parameter
partitions rms into rationed rms and non-rationed rms; hence, the extent of buying power of
non-rationed rms, and, also, the extent of asset liquidations.
Thus, the equilibrium price satises the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The market-clearing price for asset sales, p, is unique and weakly increasing in
the funding liquidity  in the following manner:
(i) There exists a critical threshold ^  < p such that p = p;8  ^ ; and,
(ii) For  < ^ , p 2 [;p), p is strictly increasing in , and p =  only when  = min.
Therefore, in this region, there is an illiquidity discount, [p   p], whose size is declining in .
When  is above a critical value ^  > min, assets are liquidated at their highest valuation:
few rms are rationed, buyers (non-rationed rms) have a lot of liquidity and sellers (rationed
rms) do not need to de-lever much. As the incentives to risk-shift increase, that is,  declines,
there is not enough liquidity in the system to absorb the pool of assets being put up for liquidation
at the highest price. Hence, the market-clearing price is lower than p. Since assets are \cheap",
non-rationed rms demand as much as possible of the liquidated assets with their entire available
liquidity. On the supply side, as price falls, more rms are rationed, and rationed rms must
liquidate more. As the risk-shifting incentives increase ( becomes smaller), prices fall until
eventually they hit , and this happens when in fact  equals min.
The liquidation price exhibits \cash-in-the-market pricing" as in Allen and Gale (1994, 1998)
since it depends on the overall amount of liquidity available in the system for asset purchases,
which, in turn, is determined by the risk-shifting incentives. The important message from this
analysis is that whether a rationed rm can relax its own borrowing constraint by selling assets
depends upon the liquidity of the potential purchasers of its assets (through the liquidation price)
and on the liquidation of assets by other such rationed rms. Thus, one can think of the excess
demand for the asset, E(p;)  [D(p;)   S(p;)], given by equation (10), as an inverse
measure of the excess nancial leverage in the system.5
Another important observation is that part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies a natural link between
funding liquidity of rms and liquidity of asset markets. Funding liquidity in our model is measured
by . Market illiquidity can be measured as the re-sale discount in prices, [p   p]. The
5These features of our model are essentially variants of the industry-equilibrium eects in Shleifer and Vishny
(1992)'s model. Crucially, however, the determinants of rationing and of the limited ability of buyers to purchase
are both tied to the same underlying state variable, the extent of risk-shifting problem.
12Proposition formally shows that funding liquidity and market illiquidity are negatively related.6
Unlike the extant literature where funding liquidity is modeled through exogenously specied
margin or collateral requirements, our measure of funding liquidity is linked to the amount of
nancing that can be raised given the risk-shifting problem tied to leverage.
We combine Proposition 2 with Proposition 1 to obtain the result that the extent of asset
sales required by a rationed rm is higher when asset's funding liquidity is lower.
Proposition 3 The extent of asset sale by rm with liability , denoted as (), is decreasing
in the funding liquidity .
The following example which assumes a uniform distribution on the liabilities helps us illustrate
these equilibrium relationships graphically.
Example: Suppose that   Unif[min;max] and p = 2y2 = max. Then, solving the
market-clearing condition E(p;) = 0, yields the following equilibrium relationships:
1. If   ^   1
2(min + max), then the price for asset sales is p = max;
2. If  < 1
2(min + max), then there is cash-in-the-market pricing:
p




(max + min   2):
3. In the cash-in-the-market pricing region, the equilibrium price p is increasing and convex
in funding liquidity :
dp
d > 0 and
d2p
d2 > 0.
The price p and the amount of leverage repaid, that is, asset sale proceeds ()p, are
illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4 Panel A shows cash-in-the-market pricing when funding liquidity
is below ^ . Figure 4 Panel B is striking.7 As the risk-shifting incentives increase ( falls), a
smaller range of rms is able to relax rationing and at the same time these rms face increasingly
greater de-leveraging. Finally, Figure 4 Panel C plots market illiquidity, measured as the re-sale
discount in asset price, [p p], as a function of the funding liquidity . It illustrates that when
funding liquidity is high, market liquidity is at its maximal level. As funding liquidity deteriorates
and falls below ^ , market becomes illiquid and increasingly so as funding liquidity deteriorates.
Interpretation of funding liquidity or (inverse) moral hazard intensity: What does it mean
to vary the parameter ? Recall that  = [2(2y2   1y1)]=(2   1), so that  is increasing
6While the link here is only from funding liquidity to market liquidity, our augmented model of Section 3 will
also formalize the reverse link from market liquidity to (ex-ante) funding liquidity.
7The parameters are: 2 = 0:8, y2 = 12:5, 1 = 0:2, y1 = 20, giving max = 10 and min = 4.
13in 2, the quality of the better asset. Thus, a decrease in  can be given the economically
interesting interpretation of a deterioration in the quality of assets, for example, over the business
cycle. Note that we are holding constant the quality of bad asset 1. So strictly speaking, if
the better asset deteriorates in quality in a relative sense compared to the other asset during
a business-cycle downturn, then the risk-shifting problem gets aggravated: asset can sustain
a smaller amount of debt capacity as incentives arising from higher prots of the better asset
are weakened. Therefore, the model entertains a natural interpretation that during economic
downturns and following negative shocks to the quality of assets, there is lower funding liquidity,
and thus, greater credit rationing and de-leveraging in the economy. Accompanying these are
lower prices for asset liquidations not just due to the deterioration in asset quality but also due to
market illiquidity or the reduced capacity of potential buyers to acquire assets (as their funding
liquidity is lowered too).
In our analysis so far, we assumed the distribution of liabilities was unrelated to the quality
of assets. Relaxing this would formally imply a relationship between 2 and the distribution of
liquidity shocks g(). We build this link by analyzing the date-0 structure of the model.
3 Ex-ante debt capacity
In this section, we provide an equilibrium setting that yields the structure of liabilities i taken as
given so far. We start with a summary of what this section achieves.
We endogenize the structure of liabilities by assuming that at date 0, rms are ranked by
their initial wealth or capital levels and must raise incremental nancing to make a xed level of
investment (identical for all rms) in order to trade. The incremental nancing is raised through
short-term debt contracts, payable at date 1. Asset quality (2), taken as given so far, is now
uncertain when viewed from date 0. Depending on the interim signal of asset quality at date 1,
borrowers may not be able to pay o promised payments to lenders. Debt contracts give lenders
the ability to liquidate ex post in case of default (as in collateral and margin requirements). We
show that this contract is in fact optimal from the standpoint of raising maximum ex-ante nance.
This augmentation of the benchmark model leads to an important equilibrium recursion: on
the one hand, the promised payment for a given amount of nancing is decreasing in the level of
liquidation prices; on the other hand, the liquidation price is itself determined by the distribution
of promised debt payments to be met by rms. We show in Section 3.2 that there is a unique
solution to this recursion, characterized by the fraction of rms that are ex-ante rationed (that
is, rms that are unable to raise enough debt to meet the xed costs) and the ex-post relation
from realized asset quality to funding liquidity, and, in turn, to asset price. In particular, for
low realizations of asset quality, borrower incentives to risk-shift are high, funding liquidity is
14low, there is greater de-leveraging in the economy, and potential buyers also face tighter funding
constraints, all of which lowers the market-clearing price.
While the ex-ante rationing of rms renders analytical results on comparative statics dicult,
numerical examples in Section 3.3 help answer the primary question at hand in this paper: how
does market liquidity get aected when adverse asset shocks (formally, low realized values of 2)
materialize from good economic times that are characterized by ex-ante expectations of asset
shocks that are benign (formally, better ex-ante distributions of 2)?
3.1 The set-up
The augmented time-line is specied in Figure 5. Suppose that at date 0, there is a continuum
of rms that have access to an investment opportunity with identical payos. However, each
rm has to raise a dierent amount of external nance in order to access the opportunity, for
example, due to diering levels of internal capital. We assume that the investment shortfall of
rm i is externally nanced via a debt contract with a xed, promised payment of i at date 1,
against which creditors provide nancing of si; the ex-ante cumulative distribution function of si
is given by R(si) over [smin = 1y1;smax]. This assumption on the range of si ensures that no
debt less than the value of the bad (riskier) project is issued.
The investment opportunity can yield in two periods (date 2) a cash ow y2 with probability
2. However, after issuance of rollover debt and asset sales at date 1, there is the possibility
of risk-shifting. Firm owners, if optimal to do so, may switch from the existing safer asset to
the riskier asset, which yields a cash ow y1 with probability 1, where we we assume as in the
benchmark model that 1 < 2, y1 > y2, and 1y1 < i  2y2. Viewed from date 0, 2 is
uncertain: 2 has a cumulative distribution function (cdf) H(2) and probability density function
(pdf) h(2) over [min;max], where we assume for simplicity that miny2  1y1, that is, the
worst-case expected outcome for the safer asset is no worse than that for the riskier asset. In












This assumption ensures that maximum amount that can be borrowed per unit asset is  (which
is always higher than 1y1).8
Firms can attempt to meet the promised payment i at date 1 by rolling over existing debt
or equivalently by issuing new debt. Firms may also de-lever by selling assets. Note that i is
xed in that it is not contingent on the realization of 2, which we assume is observable but
8This assumption is made to simplify exposition and can be relaxed.
15not veriable. If the payment i cannot be met at date 1, then there is a transfer of control to
creditors who liquidate the assets and collect the proceeds.
Thus, for a given realization of 2, the date-1 structure of the augmented model embeds the
date-1 structure of the benchmark model where liabilities i, and their range and distribution
across rms were taken as given. In particular, the lower the realization of 2, the greater is the
risk-shifting problem, and the lower is the per unit debt capacity of the asset at date 1, denoted as
(2). Thus, 2 indexes fundamental information that determines the funding liquidity conditions
in future.
We show next that the distribution of investment shortfall si at date 0 translates into an
equilibrium distribution of date-1 promised debt payments i. Consider a particular realization of
interim signal, say 2, at date 1. As shown in Proposition 1, rms with liabilities up to (2)
= [2(2y2   1y1)]=(2   1) are not rationed. These rms can meet their outstanding debt
payments at date 1 and possibly also acquire more assets. Next, as also shown in Proposition 1,
rms with liabilities in the range ((2);p(2)] are able to meet their debt payments but only
by de-leveraging through asset sales. These rms can also meet their outstanding debt payments
at date 1 but need to scale down their asset holdings and do not have spare liquidity to acquire
more assets. Finally, rms with liabilities greater than p(2) cannot meet their outstanding debt
payments, and creditors liquidate these rms' assets.
Then, since date-0 creditors are risk-neutral, the amount of nancing si that rm i can raise









which captures the fact that for suciently low realizations of 2, the rm ends up being rationed
enough that it is unable to meet debt payments and is liquidated, whereas for high realizations
of 2, debt payments are met. The critical threshold determining whether 2 realization is \low"
or \high" for rm i is given implicitly by the relation: i = p(2). Also implicit in equation (14)
is the fact that some low-capital (high-shortfall) borrowers may be excluded altogether from the
nancial sector at date 0 since the amount owed si may not be covered by the maximum amount
available for payment the next period.
Given a price function p(2) and nancing si, equation (14) implicitly gives the face value
i that the rm must pledge to its creditors. However, we need to take account of Proposition 2
and recognize that the market-clearing price p(2) itself depends upon the entire distribution of
liabilities i across rms. In case a rm is in default, creditors recover an amount that depends
upon the asset liquidation price, and, thus on the liabilities of other rms; in turn, each rm's
ex-ante debt capacity depends on the expectation over the amount recovered.9
9This aspect of the model can be viewed as a general version of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) industry-equilibrium
16With this background, we dene the equilibrium of the ex-ante borrowing stage. An important
notational issue to bear in mind is that in the benchmark model, we assumed as exogenously given
the distribution of liabilities, G(), but in the augmented model, this distribution is induced by
the exogenously given distribution of nancing needs, R(s).
Denition of ex-ante equilibrium: A dynamic equilibrium of our set up is (i) a pair of functions
(si) and p(2), which respectively give the promised face-value for raising nancing of si units
at date 0, and the equilibrium price at date 1 given interim signal of asset quality of 2; and (ii)
a truncation point ^ s, which is the maximum amount of nancing that a rm can raise at date 0,
such that (si), p(2) and ^ s satisfy the following xed-point recursion:
1. For every 2, asset price is determined by the funding liquidity of asset and spare debt capacity






^ G(u)du ; (15)
where compared to equation (12), we have replaced distribution of liabilities G() with the dis-
tribution ^ G() and also substituted the variable of integration  with u to avoid confusion with
the function (si). In particular, ^ G(u) is the truncated equilibrium distribution of liabilities given
by ^ G(u) =
R( 1(u))
R(^ s) . Formally, ^ G(u) is induced by the distribution of nancing amounts, R(s),
via the function Prob[(si)  ujsi  ^ s]. As in case of equation (12), a strict (<) inequality in
equation (15) leads to p(2) = p(2) = 2y2.
2. Given the price function p(2), for every shortfall si 2 [0; ^ s], the promised face value  is















with a strict inequality implying that ^ s = smax (all borrowers are nanced).10
model of debt capacity.
10For future reference, we note that dierentiating equality versions of equations (15) and (16) yields alternative
173.2 The solution
We prove that there is a unique dynamic equilibrium that solves the xed-point recursion stated
above and provide an explicit characterization of the solution.
In what follows, we suppress the subscript i unless it is necessary. Also, it is easier to analyze
the equilibrium recursion by working with the inverse functions s() and 2(p). Here s() gives
the nancing raised ex ante for a given face-value  while 2(p) gives the realization of the state
2 for a given equilibrium price p.11 A solution to the xed-point recursion exists and is unique;
we state the result as a formal proposition below and focus on the economic properties of the
xed-point. The technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique solution to the dynamic equilibrium dened in Section 3.1:
1. Given a maximal borrowing amount ^ s, the borrowing s() as a function of face value is given
by the unique solution to the (integro-dierential) equation:12
ds
d




(1y1 + L()) +
p







with the end-point constraint that s(1y1) = 1y1.
2. Given s(), the inverse equilibrium price function 2(p) is uniquely given by
2(p) = max
(
(1y1 + L(p)) +
p







over the domain [1y1;maxy2].












1   ^ G(p)
if p < 2y2, else
dp
d2






if   p(min), else
d
dsi
= 1 : (19)
11Since these are one-to-one functions, we can follow this approach. Notice that both  and p have the domain
[1y1;maxy2] (one cannot have a face value higher than the highest possible price); it is possible that the upper
bound is not reached in equilibrium and we account for this.




18where p(2) is implicitly also function of ^ s.
The solution to the xed-point recursion is a contraction and can be used to compute the
equilibrium using a recursive algorithm outlined in the Appendix. Next, we compute numerical
examples to answer why the drying up of liquidity is more severe when crises emanate from good
economic times.
3.3 Severity of crises in good economic times
An apparent \puzzle" in nancial markets is that when there is a sudden, adverse asset-quality
shock to the economy from a period of high expectations of fundamentals, the drop in asset
prices seems rather severe. This is perhaps best epitomized by the crisis of 2007-09, which was
preceded during 2003 to 2Q 2007 by a period of extraordinary benign conditions (Figures 1 and
2). This phenomenon was also highlighted in the introductory quote based on remarks by Paul
McCulley in PIMCO's Investment Outlook of Summer 2007, which argued that at the onset of
sub-prime crisis, the nancial system appeared to switch from expectations of low volatility and
abundant global liquidity to one with severe asset-price deterioration and severe drying up of
both market and funding liquidity. While there is no explicit role for \volatility" in our model,
we ask a related question: Does a better date-0 distribution of future asset quality shocks lead
to greater market and funding liquidity problems at date 1? We explain below that somewhat
counter-intuitively, the answer to this question in our model is yes.
To understand why, we solve two numerical examples using the recursive algorithm provided
in the Appendix to compute the date-0 equilibrium. In both numerical examples, we consider a
situation where the distribution of asset quality improves in a rst-order stochastic dominance
(FOSD) sense. Such comparative statics are in general ambiguous in the model because of the
eect of endogenous entry (the last marginal project that can be nanced depends on econ-
omy's parameters), as an improvement in the expectation of fundamentals (FOSD increase in the
distribution of 2) has two countervailing eects.
The rst eect of improvement in fundamentals is to weakly increase expected prices at date
1, for a given pool of rms nanced at date 0. Simply, downside risk is less likely. This increase
in expected prices lowers creditors' losses in default, and hence, the cost of debt. Formally, (s)
is lower in good times for any given s. This, however, leads to an interesting second eect. The
lower cost of debt results in the pool of rms nanced at date 0 to expand to include higher
leverage rms. Or formally, the maximal shortfall that can be nanced, ^ s, is higher in good times.
In other words, the starting capital structure of the economy is endogenous to expectations of
fundamentals: in good times, debt is cheap and there is entry of low-capital or high-leverage
institutions in the nancial sector. We show below that this endogeneity of entry and capital
19structure implies that even though adverse asset shocks are less likely to materialize in good times
(given the FOSD characterization of good economic times), in case they do, then there is greater
de-leveraging in the economy and market-clearing prices for asset sales can sometimes be lower
than when the same adversity of shocks materializes in bad times.
In an example that delivers this counterintuitive insight, we let:
a) smin = 1y1 = 0:2, smax = 1, y1 = 4, y2 = 1, 1 = 0:05, so that s has support [0:2;1]; and,
b) t = 0:8 (which is also the value of smax  smin) and suppose that the distribution of nancing





c) 2 to be distributed as H() on [min;max] such that13





where ,  > 0 (note that  = 1 corresponds to the uniform distribution). A higher value of
 implies rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD); in fact for any truncation ^ s, the maximal
shortfall that can be nanced in the economy, a higher value of  implies FOSD.14 Also, note
that E[] is min + [(max   min)]=[1 + ] which is increasing in . We let  take values in
f0:5;5:0g. So  = 0:5 corresponds to bad economic times and  = 5:0 to good economic times.
We show for these values the distributions of the promised face-value (\cost") of leverage,
(s), in one plot (Figure 6 Panel A) and the market-clearing price, p(), in another plot (Figure 6
Panel B). The gures show large variations in cost of leverage and price as we vary  and change
the distribution of fundamentals. Further Figure 6 Panel C shows the cumulative distribution
of liabilities (the endogenous G() function) and Figure 6 Panel D shows the (endogenous)
cumulative distribution of prices.
As explained previously, there are two countervailing intuitions at play in this example. First,
if we keep ^ s xed, an improvement in fundamentals (higher ) leads to lower face values for debt
and hence lower endogenous liabilities (this is apparent from traveling vertically in Figure 6 Panel
A for any shortfall s). The lower liabilities imply lower liquidations by any given rm and this
tends to result in higher prices state by state (any realized value of 2). However, as fundamentals
improve, the pool of rms nanced at date 0 expands. In particular, the threshold ^ s below which
rms are nanced moves to the right on the x-axis, as can be seen by traveling horizontally in
Figure 6 Panel A. This means that more levered rms enter the nancial sector when expected
13Here min = 0:3732 using the restriction in Equation (13) and max = 0:9.
14Hopenhayn (1992) refers to this as monotone conditional dominance or MCD.
20fundamentals are better. In other words, for low realizations of fundamentals (2), while each
rm de-leverages less, there are more rms that need to de-lever, there is greater economy-wide
distress and this pushes the market-clearing prices lower, as is apparent by traveling vertically in
Figure 6 Panel B.
Consequently, an improvement in the expected distribution of fundamentals results in worse
prices when nancial distress materializes. This can be seen in Figure 6 Panel C which shows
a higher cumulative distribution of liabilities ((s)) when expectations for the future are better
(higher ). However, note that in an ex-ante sense, the probability of reaching nancial dis-
tress states is much lower with better expected distribution of fundamentals. Figure 6 Panel
D illustrates this by showing the cumulative distribution function of prices p() under the two
distributions. Hence, in expectation prices are still higher, which is precisely why ^ s is higher in
Figure 6 Panel A and higher leverage is sustained at date 0.
This example makes it clear that good expectations about the future enable even low-capital
institutions to be funded ex ante and the resulting distribution of leverage in the economy can
potentially lead to (il)liquidity eects in prices that are worse during crises that follow good times.
Put another way, downside risk or negative skewness of future prices can be higher when adverse
shocks arise in good times.
This outcome seems to have accompanied the phenomenon of Great Moderation in developed
economies. A sectoral downward shift in volatility (Figure 2 Panel B) over the past two decades
appeared to have led to cheap leverage (Figure 1 Panels A and B). This, in turn, gave rise
to entry of relatively low-capital institutions in the nancial sector in the form of structured
purpose vehicles such as ABCP conduits and SIVs (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2009) and
rapid asset growth of broker-dealers (Adrian and Shin, 2008). Accompanying this entry was
substantial growth in ownership of assets related to residential and commercial real estate in
these economies. When a severe aggregate shock hit the quality of these assets in the form of
housing sector meltdown, de-leveraging and asset sales by highly levered nancial institutions,
again notably ABCP conduits and broker-dealers, ensued. The relatively healthier institutions
such as commercial banks with lower leverage also possessed little funding liquidity given the
deterioration of the real estate assets they held. As a result, prices of real estate related assets
seemed far lower than would be expected (Figure 2 Panel A) from a crisis that starts from
relatively benign conditions.
It is useful to ask when the eect of endogenous entry at date 0 is likely to produce this
counterintuitive phenomenon. Clearly, if the entry eect is weak, then prices can be higher state
by state at date 1 when the distribution of fundamentals at date 0 is better. To see this possibility,
we repeat the example above with a dierent distribution for nancing shortfalls at date 0:





21with  = 0:05. Our rst example, the uniform distribution, corresponds to  = 1 in this new
set-up. A higher  implies lower capital levels and more borrowing at date 0 in a FOSD sense.
The distribution with  = 0:05 has a much thinner density in the right tail compared to the
uniform distribution, implying that there are not many low-capital rms waiting at the fringe of
the nancial sector to enter. This reduces the endogenous entry eect.
Figure 7 Panels A and B show the relevant equilibrium outcomes for this example. In Figure
7 Panel A, we see again that (s) is lower when we move to better fundamentals and that ^ s is
higher. This eect that debt is cheaper in good times is the same as before. But now in Figure
7 Panel B, we see that state-by-state (), it is the low fundamentals case ( = 0:5) that has
the lower price (though the dierence is quite small). Here the entry eect, measured as the
change in ^ s, is muted because of the thinness of the right tail in the distribution of borrowing
amounts. Figure 7 Panel C shows that the endogenous distribution of liabilities G() is higher
in a FOSD sense for the lower fundamentals case. This explains why prices are lower state by
state for weaker fundamentals. Finally, Figure 7 Panel D shows that higher fundamentals lead to
higher expected prices as before.
To summarize, factors that enable low-capital institutions to enter the nancial sector in
good economic times (for example, the abundant ow of liquidity into the nancial sector due to
global imbalances (Bernanke, 2005)) also contribute to build-up of leverage in good times and
the consequent eects of de-leveraging and deeply discounted prices when crises materialize. We
note that we found it rather hard to construct the second example in that the right tail of the
borrowing distribution had to be thinned considerably. We conjecture that our rst example is
important and robust. Indeed, it seems reasonable that high expectations lead to more leveraged
players being nanced. The endogenous capital structure of nancial intermediaries over the
business cycle is thus crucial to understanding severity of nancial crises.15
3.4 Optimality of debt contracts with lender control
A key aspect of our model has been the use of short-term debt contracts, which if not rolled over
lead to asset liquidations. Alternately, these contracts can be viewed as long-term debt contracts
where lenders have interim control rights. In particular, the lender makes a two-period loan but
15In our model, there is no ex-post ineciency from asset sales and transfers. This is purely for ease of
exposition. Such ineciencies arise in practice due to a variety of reasons such as asset mis-allocation, downward
spirals relating to marking-to-market, and excess volatility (which would be welfare-relevant with risk-averse
investors). Then, the greater severity of nancial crises arising in good times creates a rationale for capital
adequacy requirements. Interestingly, the primary role of such requirements would be to exclude the entry of
poorly capitalized nancial intermediaries and thereby reduce the extent of de-leveraging when adverse shocks
materialize. Further, since leverage build-up is greater in good times, optimal requirements would have to bind
in good times, lending them a counter-cyclical property.
22can call the loan at time 1 based on an observable signal of asset quality, inducing the rm to raise
external nance or sell assets. This seems to correspond well to the nature of short-term rollover
debt such as commercial paper or margins and collateral requirements in nancial contracts. We
argue in this subsection that in a model of incomplete contracts that follows Aghion and Bolton
(1992) (see also Hart and Moore (1994), Hart (1995) and Diamond and Rajan (2001)), the
borrowing contract with lender control maximizes the ex-ante nancing available to investors.16
Our proof consists of two steps. First, we show that debt is the optimal contract. Second,
we show that borrower control at date 1 is dominated by lender control at date 1.
Consider any particular realization of asset quality 2 at date 1. Suppose for simplicity that
accordance of control rights is equivalent to the controlling party making a take-it-or-leave-it
oer at date 1. Intuitively, in absence of lender control, the borrower can always invoke the
risk-shifting problem, that is, threaten to switch to the riskier asset and strategically renegotiate
the lender down to (2). This would lower the payos to lenders at date 1. In contrast, with
lender control, the maximum amount available to lenders by threatening to force asset sales is
p(2)  (2). Hence, lender control yields higher payos to the lender ex post. Ex ante,
it is thus in the borrower's interest to give control rights to the lender and raise as much debt
nancing as possible.17 We formalize this intuition next.
To prove our results, we make three assumptions in the spirit of Aghion and Bolton (1992)
and Hart and Moore (1994).
Assumption C1: Courts can verify whether the state 0 occurs or whether fy1;y2g occurs,
however they cannot distinguish between states fy1;y2g.
This assumption essentially states that there is some coarseness in the enforcement ability of
courts. While contracts can distinguish between low and high states, they cannot discriminate
between dierent high states.
Assumption C2: While the interim state 2 is observable, it is not contractible.
This assumption forces the contract designer to give control conditional on the state 2 to
either the lender or the borrower. We believe that this assumption is justiable in the context of
nancial institutions, especially hedge funds and broker-dealers, as they have complex portfolio
16Diamond (2004) in his Presidential address also discusses why short-term debt may resolve incentive problems.
He focuses on an environment where the collective action problem makes it hard to renegotiate short-term debt
and leads to a run on the rm. This is better for the borrower in an ex-ante sense. Diamond and Rajan (2001)
present a similar argument to Diamond (2004).
17Note that our model diers from the standard Aghion and Bolton (1992) model in that borrower's ability to
invoke the moral hazard problem gives the borrower too much power ex post. The only way to limit this is to
give the ex-post control rights to the lender.
23strategies with many illiquid positions: the prime broker and hedge fund, for instance, may agree
on a valuation, but courts may nd it dicult to verify this.
Assumption C3: Payments at date 1 (ex-post states) cannot be bigger than the maximum
payo in that state or smaller than 0.
This is a limited liability assumption and precludes payments in excess of what is available.
These three assumptions yield the desired result that debt contracts with lender control are
optimal. From Assumption C1, the optimal contract must be a pair f0;ig that pays o the
same amount whether states y1 or y2 occur (we do not formally prove this as it is standard).
Assumption C2 implies that we have to compare borrower control or lender control in every
state. With borrower control, if 2i  (2), the borrower will honor the contract. However,
if 2i > (2), then we explain below that the borrower will credibly threaten to switch to the
bad project. Hence, the lender will renegotiate the claim from i to [(2)]=2 = f(2). Thus
with borrower control, the lender gets max[2i;(2)] at date 1.
To complete the argument that borrower control will lead to a credible threat of risk-shifting,
we have to show that if the borrower makes a take or leave it oer of f(2) < i and the
lender rejects (hence leaving the face value at i), the borrower will in fact risk shift. We show
this formally in the Appendix. Clearly, the borrower will risk shift if the face value is i and no
asset sales occur since by construction f(2) is the highest face value of debt for which risk-
shifting remains unattractive. We also need to consider whether the borrower would ever engage
in asset sales. Assets sales are unattractive to the borrower as they provide value to the lender
immediately and reduce the borrower's risk-shifting option. Consequently, the borrower will not
engage in asset sales and instead risk-shift, i.e., this is a credible threat.
In contrast, with lender control, the lender can threaten the borrower with liquidation at
market prices. Hence, in this case, the lender gets max[2i;p(2)], where p(2)  (2)
with strict inequality in states with suciently high 2. Thus, borrowing with control rights
allocated to the lender always generates higher ex-post payo to the lender and thus greater
ex-ante borrowing capacity for the borrower. We state this as a formal result:
Proposition 5 Under assumptions (C1){(C3), the optimal contract is debt and lender control
always yields a greater region of nanced rms than borrower control. Further the short term
debt contract with lender control is renegotiation-proof.
Giving control to the lender is renegotiation proof because if the lender were to renegotiate
the contract without asset sales, he must reduce the face value to =2 which yields a lower
value than the optimal lender-control strategy (which involves liquidation). Giving the borrower
24control at this stage is suboptimal as the borrower (for reasons argued above) will risk-shift for
sure and hence the lender will be forced to renegotiate to a lower face value of =2. In contrast
under lender control, the lender either gets 2i back or liquidates (possibly partially) to obtain
p  . Consequently, lender control is renegotiation-proof.
Proposition 5 justies the structure of nancing contracts for trading intermediaries (margin
nancing, rollover debt, etc.) where the risk-shifting problem is most pertinent. These contracts
give strong ex-post control to the lender but reduce the borrower's ability to choose among risky
projects and renegotiate. Importantly, the Proposition also rationalizes the contract structure
that we have employed in our preceding analysis.
4 Related literature
The idea that asset prices may contain liquidity discounts when potential buyers are nancially
constrained dates back to Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992).18 Since then, re
sales have been employed in nance models regularly, most notably by Allen and Gale (1994,
1998) to examine the links between limited market participation, volatility, and fragility observed
in banking and asset markets. At its roots, our model is closely linked to this literature on an
industry equilibrium view of asset sales; this makes it clear that market prices depend on funding
liquidity of potential buyers. More broadly, the overall approach and ambition of our paper in
relating the distribution of liquidity needs in an economy to equilibrium outcomes is closest to the
seminal paper of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). However, there are important dierences with
both these sets of papers.
In Allen and Gale (1994, 1998), the liquidity shocks arise as preference shocks to depositors
or investors as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), the liquidity
shocks arise as production shocks to rms' technologies. In either case, they are not endogenous
outcomes. We derive liquidity needs as being determined in equilibrium by asset-liability mismatch
of rms, where the level and distribution of liabilities in the economy is an outcome of model
primitives such as the distribution of asset quality and moral hazard problems in the future.
The liabilities become liquidity \shocks" in our model, in the sense that liabilities are known in
advance, but they take the form of \hard" debt contracts, and asset quality is uncertain in the
18Empirically, the idea of re sales has now found ample empirical evidence in a variety of dierent settings: in
distressed sales of aircrafts in Pulvino (1998), in cash auctions in bankruptcies in Stromberg (2000), in creditor
recoveries during industry-wide distress especially for industries with high asset-specicity in Acharya, Bharath and
Srinivasan (2007), in equity markets when mutual funds engage in sales of similar stocks in Coval and Staord
(2006), and, nally, in an international setting where foreign direct investment increases during emerging market
crises to acquire assets at steep discounts in the evidence by Krugman (1998), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), and
Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2007).
25future. The optimality of hard debt contract in our model with control rights given to lenders
in case of default mirrors the work of Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994), Hart
(1995), and Diamond and Rajan (2001).
In our model, we derive limited funding liquidity as arising due to credit rationing caused
by risk-shifting moral hazard. Our specic modeling approach is closely related to the earlier
models in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Diamond (1989, 1991). In contrast, Holmstrom and
Tirole's model of limited funding liquidity is based on rent-seeking moral hazard which appears a
more appropriate metaphor for agency problems aecting real or technological choices, whereas
risk-substitution ts better nancial investment choices (typically by highly levered institutions).19
Our primary goal is to consider the implications of endogenously derived funding liquidity of assets
for market prices and equilibrium leverage of the nancial sector.
Our work is also related to the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) on credit cycles.
In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Krishnamurthy (2003), the underlying asset cannot be pledged
because of inalienable human capital.20 However, land can be pledged and has value both as a
productive asset and as collateral. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) employ a Holmstrom-
Tirole approach to liquidity shocks (these are exogenous) and allow rms to post collateral in a
manner similar to Kiyotaki and Moore. In contrast, the underlying asset in our model can be
pledged (\asset sale") but the pledgeable amount is endogenously determined by the risk-shifting
problem and the equilibrium distribution of leverage; in turn this determines the asset demands
from potential buyers. In this sense, our objectives can be considered as the nancial markets
counterpart to those of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) who considered the role of real collateral in
ameliorating agency problems linked to real investments, and its implications for business cycle.
Our model also has implications for the recent work in nance linking market liquidity and
funding liquidity due to Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Plantin and Shin (2006), Anshuman and
Viswanathan (2006), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Garleanu and Pedersen (2009).
In Gromb and Vayanos (2002), agents can only borrow if each asset is separately and fully
collateralized, i.e., borrowing is essentially riskless. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), there
is a collateral requirement that limits funding liquidity and is essentially exogenous: a shock
to prices (or volatility) leads to liquidity shocks, that, in turn, leads to liquidation by nancial
intermediaries who engage in risk management. Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) consider margin
constraints on certain intermediaries and assets. These models do not explicitly consider why
lenders engage in risk management and why collateral or margin requirements are imposed (even
though they do recognize that agency problems must be at play). Plantin and Shin (2006)
19For instance, it is hard for an auto manufacturer to hide its risks and be doing bio-tech pursuits instead of
its core business, but relatively easy for a hedge-fund manager or investment bank to hide its risks by speculating
in opaque or illiquid nancial assets.
20Krishnamurthy (2003) diers from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in that all contingent claims on aggregate
variables are allowed subject to collateral constraints.
26consider a dynamic variant of this feedback eect focusing on application to the unwinding of
carry trades and their precipitous eect on exchange rates.21 Anshuman and Viswanathan (2006)
point out that the ability to renegotiate constraints can eliminate liquidity crises of the nature
analyzed in these papers, unless some other frictions are present.
Our paper presents one such friction arising due to the ability of nancial intermediaries to
substitute risks, which limits their borrowing capacity. Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2008)
consider adverse selection as the relevant friction that generates price discounts in asset liquida-
tions and limits funding capacity. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are likely to be at play
in practice. Hence, we view our work as complementary to that of Bolton et al (2008).
Finally, Lorenzoni (2008) considers a competitive model of intermediaries with rent-seeking
moral hazard and shows that there can be excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility
ex post. Lorenzoni's focus is on the (in)eciency of the competitive equilibrium due to the
pecuniary externality of asset liquidations and on preventive policies to curb the credit bubble
and improve welfare. In our model too, the pecuniary externality exists as each rm's liquidations
lower asset prices, raise loss given default for lenders, and thus raise ex-ante cost of borrowing for
all rms. We focus, however, on the positive implications for nancial crises arising from a risk-
shifting problem faced by intermediaries rather than the normative implications of the rent-seeking
problem considered by Lorenzoni. Footnote 15 discussed how such normative considerations could
be introduced in our model to derive welfare implications.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we presented a model of the nancial sector in which short-term or rollover debt
is an optimal contracting response to the manager's ability to risk-shift across assets. This risk-
shifting limits the manager's ability to raise new debt to roll over old short term debt and provides a
microeconomic foundation for the linkage between market liquidity and funding liquidity. Building
on this foundation, we derived a body of results that help understand the de-leveraging of the
nancial sector during crises, including the crisis of 2007-09. In particular, we showed that the
extent of the funding liquidity problem and induced de-leveraging or re sales faced by each
nancial rm is determined by the extent of its own short-term debt, the adversity of the asset
shock, the specicity of assets to borrowers relative to lenders, and the amount of short-term
debt with potential buyers of assets, i.e., other nancial rms.
Our most surprising result was that since good economic times are associated with a low cost
of short-term debt and in turn greater entry of highly-levered nancial institutions, adverse asset
21Morris and Shin (2004) present a model where traders are liquidated when an exogenous trigger price is
reached and this trigger is dierent for each trader.
27shocks that materialize after such times lead to greater de-leveraging and asset-price deterioration.
While the incidence of nancial crisis is lower when expectations of fundamentals are high, the
severity of crisis that arise subsequently can be greater due to the greater system-wide leverage.
Recognizing this crucial role played by the distribution of leverage in the nancial sector - and its
endogenous relationship to the business cycle - appears central to understanding crises.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: We rst prove that the market-clearing price p exists and is unique.

















if p = p
where at price p, we get an interval of possible demand as buyers are indierent between not
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if p = p
where as before we get an interval at p.
Step 2. Note that the excess demand for p =  is positive innity.
Step 3. If the excess demand is positive for all p < p, the price must be p, as at p the interval
denition of excess demand above includes 0. So, p is the only feasible price. Intuitively, if there
are more agents willing to buy than sell at the highest possible price, this must be the price.
Step 4. If the excess demand is negative as p ! p, we must have at least one solution for p.
However, we note that for  < p < p, the derivative of the excess demand (when the excess








p     1
(p ) +
G(p)
p  < 0; (26)
where we use the fact that a positive excess demand implies that 1
(p )
R p
min G()d  1 and
that G(p) < 1. Hence, when excess demand is zero, its derivative must also be negative, so we
can only have one price that sets excess demand to zero and the price p is unique.
Step 5. To prove that p is increasing in , note that the excess demand function has a
positive derivative with respect to  for all p < p (as can be veried using the expression for
28excess demand in Step 1 above). Since the excess demand function is strictly downward sloping
for positive excess demand, it immediately follows that p is strictly increasing in  if p < p;
otherwise the price just stays at p.
Step 6. It follows from Step 5 that there exists a unique critical value ^  2 (min;p) such that
the market-clearing price p = p;8  ^  and p < p otherwise, in which case p satises
equation (12). Note also from equation (12) that we must have p   with equality arising
only when  = min. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4: The xed point problem of Section 3.1 can be solved as follows. Fix a
maximal nancing ^ s. First we invert (15) and solve for 2(p): we show below that since this is an
explicit quadratic equation, we can solve for this variable. We impose the constraint that price is
at most 2y2. We can substitute 2(p) into the dierential equation for s(), (19), to obtain an
integro-dierential equation that has a unique solution for s(). The maximum nancing is then
uniquely solved by the boundary condition in (17).
Given the cdf of amount nanced, R(s), the cdf of face values conditional on nancing being
over the truncated support of amounts nanced [1y1; ^ s], is denoted as ^ G(u), and is given by
^ G(u) =
R(s(u))
R(^ s) , where ^ G(u) = Prob[  ujs  ^ s] = Prob[s()  s(u)js  ^ s]. Dene




where we have switched back to  as being the variable of integration.




= L(p) ; (28)
which yields an explicit solution for 2. Since prices cannot be above 2y2 (hence 2 
p
y2), we
obtain the following solution for 2(p)
2(p) = max
(
(1y1 + L(p)) +
p







on the domain [1y1;maxy2]. Note that this equation denes 2(p) in terms of s() since L(p)
depends on the function ^ G() =
R(s())
R(^ s) .22
22Note that if p = 1y1, then equation (29) is determined by the rst expression in the max operator and 2(p)
= min as L(1y1) = 1y1. At the other end point, p = maxy2, either we have 2(maxy2) = max, and there is
no price discount at max; or 2(maxy2) > max and there is a price discount in every state.
29Next, we solve the dierential equation implied by (19) (which is itself equivalent to (16)):
ds
d
= 1   H(2()); (30)
where H(2) is the cdf of 2. Since it is possible that 2(p) > max in (30), we extend H(2) by
assuming that H(2) = 1 for 2 > max (this is true and innocuous since 1 H(2) = 0 for such
2). Then, substituting for 2(p) from (29), we obtain that
ds
d




(1y1 + L()) +
p







with the end-point constraint that s(1y1) = 1y1.













with the end-point constraint s(1y1) = 1y1, and it has a unique solution if the function f(;t)
is Lipschitz in t and the function R(s) is Lipschitz in s (as we show below).





where p(2) is the inverse function of 2(p) and h(2) is the density of 2.
The left hand side of (33) is 1y1 at ^ s = 1y1 and increasing in ^ s. The right hand side of (33)
is strictly greater than 1y1 at ^ s = 1y1 and decreasing in ^ s.23 Either (33) has a unique solution
or no solution with strict inequality at ^ s, in that case there is no exclusion and ^ s = smax.
This completes the proof of proposition, save the technical detail below.
Existence and uniqueness of solution to the xed-point problem: Granas and Dugundji
(2003), Theorem 2.1, shows a general approach to existence of Volterra integral equations of the
second kind. We adapt their proof to our set up.
We rst show that if f(;t) is Lipschitz in t with Lipschitz constant L1 and R(s) is Lipschitz
in s with Lipschitz constant L2, we can prove existence and uniqueness, at the end of the proof
23To see this note that if we increase ^ s, we decrease ^ G(), which means we increase L(p) and hence 2(p);
therefore p(2) decreases, and, in turn, the right hand side of the (33) decreases.
30we provide sucient conditions of the Lipschitz continuity of these functions. Here the function
R(s) is the cdf of initial borrowing and f(;t) is the function implicitly dened in Equations (31)
and (32).
Let L = maxfL1;
L2
R(^ s)g. Let E be the Banach space of all continuous real valued function





This norm is equivalent to the standard sup norm jjxjjs (a function Lipschitzian in one norm is
Lipschitzian in any equivalent norm) because
e
 Lmaxy2jjxjjs  jjxjj  jjxjjs: (35)
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 L(maxy2 1y1))
2 jjs
0   sjj (38)
which is contractive as (1 e L(maxy2 1y1)) < 1. Hence, by the Banach contraction theorem, we
have a unique xed point in E and the sequence given by successive iterations F n(s) converges
to this unique xed point uniformly in the norm jjjj and hence in the standard sup norm jjjjs.
We now ll in the details of Lipschitz continuity. We know that if an arbitrary function f
is dierentiable with bounded derivative f0()  L, then f is Lipschitz with constant K < L.
Thus, it suces for the cdf R(s) to assume that it has bounded derivative over the interval
[1y1;maxy2].





(1y1 + (   t)) +
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is Lipschitz in , dene the auxiliary function
^ f(;t) = 1   H
 
(1y1 + (   t)) +
p




which is Lipschitz is  provided the cdf H() is dierentiable with bounded derivatives. But this
suces for function f. Given , let ^ t() be the point where the two terms in the maximum
function are equal (the function is not dierentiable at this point in t). If t;t0  ^ t(), the
Lipschitz continuity of ^ f(;t) in t suces. If t > ^ t() > t0 we note that jf(;t)   f(;t0)j =
jf(;t)   f(;^ t())j and we can use the Lipschitz continuity of ^ f(;t) in t as follows:
jf(;t)   f(;t
0)j = jf(;t)   f(;^ t())j = j ^ f(;t)   ^ f(;^ t())j = L1j^ t()   tj  L1jt
0   tj
32which completes the proof of Lipschitz continuity of the function f(;t) in t.
Solving the integro-dierential equation: Finally, we discuss the numerical method used to
solve the integro-dierential equation,
ds
d




(1y1 + L()) +
p







with the end point constraint that s(1y1) = 1y1.





where we have used the fact that 2y2 is the highest possible price in each state.
Then, the recursive algorithm works as follows. We start with s() =  on [1y1;maxy2] and
use this to derive a rst order Riemann sum numerical approximation to the integral on a discrete






(tk   tk 1) ^ G(tk 1): (43)
For each tn,
L(tn) = tn  
n X
k=1
(tk   tk 1) ^ G(tk 1): (44)
The integro-dierential equation is then approximated by the rst order Taylor expansion
s(tn+1)













This yields a new grid approximation s(tn). Next, we set the value of ^ s as s(tN) and repeat
the above process until convergence occurs (maximum dierence in s(tn) is 0:001). This ensures
that ^ s also converges.
Proof of Proposition 5:
33We provide the details of the credibility of the borrower's threat to risk-shift when he has
control. Suppose the borrow threatens to risk shift and oers the lender a new face value of
=2 where 2i > . We need to show that when the lender rejects this oer and keeps the
face value at i, the borrower will risk shift, i.e., the threat is credible. In particular, we have to
show that it is not optimal for the borrower to engage in any asset sales. If the borrower does
not engage in asset sales, he will risk-shift since i > =2 and hence the borrower will obtain
in expectation 1(y1   i).
If the borrower sells assets of fraction , he will obtain a price p  2y2 for these assets.
Clearly, he will not sell the whole rm since 1(y1 i) > 2(y2 i) > 2y2 i  p i, i.e., it
is not optimal to pay the face value today given the value of the option to risk shift. Generalizing
this, if the lender sells a fraction  and pays p to the lender, his remaining loan amount is given
by (1   )^ i = i   p. If ^ i > =2, the lender will risk shift and we know that
1[(1   )(y1   ^ i)]
< 1[(1   )(y1   ^ i)] + 1[(y1   p)]
= 1(y1   i): (46)
Hence, the borrower will not sell assets and then risk shift, i.e., asset sales are not optimal for
the borrower when he risk shifts.
The last possibility is that the borrower sells just enough assets so as not to risk shift, i.e., ^ i
= =2. In this case, we obtain similarly that
2[(1   )(y2   ^ i)]
= 1[(1   )(y1   ^ i)]
< 1[(1   )(y1   ^ i)] + 1[(y1   p)]
= 1(y1   i) (47)
where we have used the indierence to risk shifting in the rst equality.
Intuitively, it is not optimal for the borrower to conduct asset sales and not to risk shift as
this only helps the lender. Asset sales reduce the value of the risk-shifting option and give the
lender the money one-period early, which cannot be optimal for the borrower ex post.
The second aspect of the proof that we complete here is that lender control is renegotiation-
proof. In any renegotiation, the lender has to reduce the lending to  as otherwise risk-shifting
occurs. Given that the lender cannot distinguish between fy1;y2g and he cannot ask for more
than 0 in the low state, the optimal contract must be debt. Consequently, if he is to get more than
 in value, he has to force asset sales. We have already seen that the borrower will never engage
in asset sales, so the lender cannot give control to him. Hence, no renegotiation is possible at
34date 1, i.e., lender control is optimal, lenders do not renegotiate at date 1, and forced liquidations
will occur in equilibrium.
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Federal funds rate during 2007 (Source: Federal Reserve Board). Panel B shows the outstanding
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38Figure 2: Panel A shows the behavior of VIX, the option-implied measure of volatility during
2000-2009 (Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange). Panel B illustrates subprime mortgage
AAA-tranche pricing in 2007-2008. The gure charts the AAA-tranche of the ABX index of the
2006 and 2007 rst and second half of the year series from January 1, 2007 to December 31,
2008. The ABX index is an index of 20 representative collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of
subprime mortgages. The AAA-tranche represents an initial equally-weighted portfolio of these




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B: Equilibrium de-leveraging or asset-sale proceeds as             





















































Panel C: The relationship between market (il)liquidity





































Funding liquidity ρ*  
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